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Knowing, Learning and Teaching—
How Homo Became Docens
Anders Ho¨gberg, Peter Ga¨rdenfors & Lars Larsson
This article discusses the relation between knowing, learning and teaching in relation to
early Palaeolithic technologies. We begin by distinguishing between three kinds of knowl-
edge: knowing how, knowing what and knowing that. We discuss the relation between these
types of knowledge and different forms of learning and long-term memory systems. On the
basis of this analysis, we present three types of teaching: (1) helping and correcting; (2)
showing; and (3) explaining. We then use this theoretical framework to suggest what kinds
of teaching are required for the pre-Oldowan, the Oldowan, the early Acheulean and the late
Acheulean stone-knapping technologies. As a general introductory overview to this special
section, the text concludes with a brief presentation of the papers included.
Introduction
Homo sapiens is the only extant species that systemat-
ically educates conspecifics. In so doing, we help and
encourage our children to gain extraordinary knowl-
edge and skills. This enables them to do remark-
able things like perceiving complicated patterns that
help them categorize things in the world and learn-
ing connections between events that help them per-
ceive causal structures. Much of this is achieved via
teaching. Other species are able to learn through im-
itation and facilitation, but proper teaching seems to
be absent. The intergenerational cultural transmission
of skills, concepts and facts by teaching is unique to
humans. So something has happened during the evo-
lution of Homo sapiens that also made us Homo docens.
Without learning, there could be no teaching.
Learning increases human knowledge and thereby
stimulates what Haidle et al. (2015) have termed an
expansion of human cultural capacity, contributing to
the unique human socio-cognitive niche construction
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Whiten & Erdal 2012). There
are many kinds of learning, but social learning has
been a significant behaviour adaptation of hominins
throughout prehistory (Heyes 2012a). Renfrew et al.
(2009, xiii) identified cultural learning as what makes
Homo special and underlined the importance of study-
ing why and how the sapient minds learned to learn
more extensively than in any other species. Others
have focused on related areas like learning and en-
vironmental adaptation (Shennan & Steel 1999), hu-
man ecology, information storage and cultural learn-
ing (Bentley & O´Brien 2013; Henrich 2004), evolution
of modern thinking and increased working memory
(Coolidge & Wynn 2009), the emergence of the social
brain (Dunbar 1998; Gowlett et al. 2012), co-evolution
of hominin tool-making teaching and language (Mor-
gan et al. 2015), human evolution in the light of ex-
tant non-human tool users (Whiten et al. 2009), neuro-
archaeology and cognition (Stout et al. 2015; Stout &
Khreisheh, this issue), the successive development of
a uniquely long period of human childhood, allow-
ing imaginary play to expand (Nielsen 2011; Nowell
2010; this issue), stone tools and the evolution of hu-
man cognition (Nowell & Davidson 2010), to mention
a few of many areas (for overview, see e.g. Beaune et al.
2009; Renfrew et al. 2009). However, while a multitude
of aspects of evolution and learning have been exam-
ined, surprisingly few studies are devoted to investi-
gating teaching and the specific roles teaching might
have had in human evolution (but see Ga¨rdenfors &
Ho¨gberg submitted; Kline 2015).
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In this text we suggest that the evolution of hu-
man cooperation and cultural learning (Heyes 2012a,
b) may crucially rely on one important mechanism:
the ability to teach. Other species are able to learn
through copying or facilitation (Whiten et al. 2009),
but the process of advanced intergenerational trans-
mission of knowledge by proper teaching is unique to
humans (Ga¨rdenfors & Ho¨gberg submitted). The evo-
lution of teaching should thus be understood differ-
ently in comparison to other forms of social learning,
e.g. emulation or imitation.
We bring forward teaching as a bridging activ-
ity in what Sterelny (2012, 8) describes as ‘positive
feedback loops’ between social complexity and in-
dividual cognitive capacities. Teaching goes beyond
other forms of social learning and becomes a way to
organize society to facilitate intergenerational trans-
mission of knowledge. Our suggestion is that putting
teaching instead of learning in focus will change the
perspective from the ways individuals learned tech-
nological skills to the ways society arranged for tech-
nological skills to be taught.
In this text we elaborate on this theme by dis-
cussing different aspects of knowledge on the basis
of the concepts ‘knowing how’, ‘knowing that’ and
‘knowing what’. We also discuss different kinds of
teaching, linking them to cognitive evolution. Our
starting point is that human evolution should be
thought of as multi-linear (Steward 1955) and mul-
tifactorial (Shennan 2002)—a diverse set of on-going
processes (Haidle et al. 2015) forming co-evolutionary
factors that over a long time have resulted in the Homo
docens as we see ourselves today.
Most teaching is informal
When thinking about teaching in present-day soci-
ety, activities in modern classrooms naturally come to
mind. In contrast to informal learning in traditional
cultures, such formalized teaching is a comparatively
recent phenomenon and hence not our focus here.
A number of ethnographic studies show that infor-
mal teaching is traditionally an integrated part of ev-
eryday activities (Greenfield et al. 2000). In informal
learning children are taught, by adults or peers, the
conditions of their work and behaviour through play-
ful participation (Kamp 2001). Even though it can be
organized in various ways (d’Errico & Banks, this is-
sue), most researchers agree that play has a vital role
in children’s learning. For example, in a study looking
into childhood in Inuit societies, Park (1998) empha-
sizes that children mimic and imitate adults in tasks
like hunting, care-taking and household activities, and
in so doing the children actually enact the life of the
grown-ups (Lombard, this issue). This kind of play is
both playful diversion and preparation for integration
into society’s social and material activities.
Recognizing that teaching is not to be thought
of as formal education, we here focus on the evolu-
tion of cognitive capacities required to teach and to
be taught. Riede (2006, 63) points out that stone-tool
production skills in prehistory would largely have
consisted of routine procedures, practised repeatedly
from an early age and thus deeply embodied in the
Palaeolithic people. Fully acknowledging this, we ar-
gue that a focus on teaching will elucidate what is
hidden in what Riede calls ‘routine procedures and
practices repeated’ in forms of social interaction.
Knowing how, knowing that and knowing what
Cultural learning is usually defined as processes that
are ‘thought to enable cumulative cultural evolu-
tion, i.e. the non-genetic inheritance of information
in a way that allows individual and group pheno-
types to achieve a progressively better fit with the de-
mands of the social and physical environment’ (Heyes
2012a, 2181). Building on discussions of the role of
social learning in human cultural evolution, Heyes
(2012a) has extended the Associative Sequence Learn-
ing model. Using imitation as an example, she shows
that a task a learner observes must be translated into
individual actions to be understood in such a way that
the task can be performed by the learner. This is made
possible ‘by direct, excitatory connections between
visual and motor representations of actions’ (Heyes
2012a, 2185). A learner who observes a sequence of
actions, for example the production of a stone tool,
generates a mental image of the sequence. Commenc-
ing to perform what has been observed, the learner
creates an understanding of ‘what it feels like to exe-
cute the action’ (Heyes 2012a, 2185). It is the relation
between observations and the experience of execution
that results in social learning.
The neuro-psychological differentiation between
visual and motor representations of actions links
well to the commonplace epistemological distinc-
tion between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’
(Ryle 1945). In archaeology, and especially within the
French school of technological chaıˆne ope´ratoire stud-
ies (Pe´le´grin 1990), these concepts, normally refer-
eed to as ‘knowledge’ and ‘know-how’ (see Ho¨gberg
2009), are important (Tostevin 2012). ‘Knowing how’
depends on muscular embodied memory. It is tacit
knowledge that is acquired through practical expe-
rience (Apel 2001), hence linking to motor represen-
tations. ‘Knowing that’ is communicative, something
that can be transferred from one person to another
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through language, by speech, signs, gestures, sounds,
etc., hence linking to visual and other sensory repre-
sentation (Heyes 2012a).
The distinction between the two kinds of knowl-
edge basically corresponds to the Aristotelian dis-
tinction between episteˆmeˆ (scientific knowledge) and
techneˆ (skill, art or craft). Current philosophical de-
bate (Fantl 2012) concerns whether the two kinds are
independent—a position called anti-intellectualism—
or whether ’knowing how’ can be reduced to ’know-
ing that’—a position called intellectualism (see e.g.
Stanley 2011). Heyes (2012a) takes this debate further
and suggests that neither independence nor reduc-
tion is sufficient to understand how these concepts
link to processes of social learning. Instead, she em-
phasizes that it is not visual or motor representation of
actions that is important for learning, but the connec-
tions between them. These connections do not emerge
by themselves—social learning is needed. It is im-
portant to notice that the more advanced the learn-
ing gets, these connections require different forms of
teaching to be achieved (Ga¨rdenfors & Ho¨gberg sub-
mitted; Haidle et al. 2015).
Here, we also want to distinguish a third kind of
knowledge—’knowing what’. ’Knowing what’ con-
cerns the ability to categorize objects, for example to
know what kind of tool an object is and what kind
of work it is associated with, or what kind of disease
somebody is suffering from. ‘Knowing what’ is cen-
tral in planning a technological activity such as stone
knapping: you must know what your goal product
is before you start the production process. This kind
of knowledge is framed, not just by technology and
skills, but by culture. ‘Knowing what’ is socialized
and materialized, something discussed by Lemonnier
(1992) as ‘the social representations of technologies’.
The division of knowledge into ’knowing how’,
’knowing what’ and ’knowing that’ can be compared
to the three different kinds of long-term memory pro-
posed by Tulving (1985):
(1) Procedural memory, which allows the organism to
remember the connections between stimuli and
responses of different kinds. This kind of memory
corresponds to ’knowing how’;
(2) Semantic memory, which allows agents to cognize
actively about categories and objects. Semantic
memory is closely related to pattern recognition.
This kind corresponds to ’knowing what’;
(3) Episodic memory, which allows agents to remem-
ber individual events and the order in which they
have occurred. This kind corresponds to ’knowing
that’.
Tulving claims that the order in which memory types
are presented here corresponds to the order in which
they have emerged in evolution and that episodic
memory is well developed only in humans. This
would explain why ‘knowing that’ is so central for
humans. Tulving’s thesis entails that ‘knowing how’
and ‘knowing what’ are more fundamental forms of
knowledge than ‘knowing that’.
Given the connection between different kinds of
knowledge and the long-term memory system, it fol-
lows that the different kinds of knowledge amplify
each other. Tulving’s (1985) thesis about the evolu-
tionary progress in cognitive development indicates
that it is possible to identify and analyse archaeolog-
ical contexts relevant for the study of teaching and
learning (see Haidle 2010 for discussion) in terms of
the three kinds of knowledge.
The connection between episodic memory and
human abilities to learn is also emphasized by Don-
ald (2012). His ‘mimesis hypothesis’ states that a spe-
cific form of cognition (and a corresponding culture)
mediated between those of the common ape-ancestor
and modern humans (Donald 1991). In brief, Donald
proposes that while ape culture is based on associa-
tional learning (along behaviourist lines), early Homo
evolved a new form of cognition. The basis for this
was that the body could be used volitionally to re-
peat earlier actions; to rehearse a given skill by match-
ing performance to a goal. Donald (2012) expands the
mimesis hypothesis and emphasizes that a key feature
of the human memory system is our ability to voluntar-
ily retrieve a particular memory. To distinguish modern
human learning from non-human animal learning, he
points out that ‘nonhuman animals can learn skills
with appropriate conditioning, but their performance
can be retrieved only by external cues that elicit condi-
tioned responses. Voluntary recall, as in self-triggered
conscious retrieval, the kind of recall needed to prac-
tice a skill, is absent’ (Donald 2012, 275). This implies
that there can be no rehearsal without voluntary recall
of previous performance. This assumes a ‘capacity to
self-trigger a specific procedural memory. The abil-
ity to initiate and guide the selective internal cuing
process that triggers such a memory is called “au-
tocuing”’ (Donald 2012, 276). Autocuing depends on
episodic memory, within the realm of ’knowing that’.
As we have pointed out, ’knowing how’ depends
on practice and muscle memory, i.e. the embodiment
of a technology to become skilful. This notion thus
fits well with what is called embodied cognition, that
is, that an agent’s thinking is not only confined to the
brain but strongly influenced by the activities of the
body (Rosch et al. 1992). For Donald (2012), ‘knowing
how’ is more. Beyond muscle memory, it represents
the ability to recall tasks performed and the cognitive
capacity to use recall to approve skill by rehearsal.
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As such, ‘knowing how’ links to gradual evolution of
abilities to understand causal relations, thus referring
back to visual representation (Heyes 2012a).
Riede (2006, 65) emphasizes that the actions of
prehistoric tool-makers should be seen as ‘tightly con-
strained by the transmission history of the cultural
lineage in which they are situated’ (see Tostevin 2012
for similar critique). This connects directly to the idea
that cognition is situated, that is, knowledge and learn-
ing is intimately bound to history and physical, social
and cultural contexts (Lave & Wenger 1991). As Boivin
(2008, 138) has stressed, the course of human evolu-
tion is ‘therefore a process not only of human deci-
sions, choices and ideas, but also of material forces
with which humans are surrounded, and with which
they engage’. Shennan (2002, 65) also points out that
these processes are made up of individuals managing
their lives in the light of the cultural (i.e. social and
material) traditions they are part of, whose cumula-
tive actions, conscious or not, produce evolutionary
patterns.
Odling-Smee et al. (2003, 260) have stressed that
‘much of human niche construction is guided by so-
cially learned knowledge and cultural inheritance’.
To make this happen, society must be organized in
ways to make knowledge transition possible. Trans-
mitting skills from one generation to another is done
in a context and is hence dependent on its application
in the world (Nonaka et al. 2010, 165). However, the
more complex societies become during hominin evo-
lution, the less sufficient individual learning is, and
the higher the demands on transmitting knowledge
via teaching become.
Teaching and cognitive evolution
In this section we present different forms of teach-
ing that connect to different forms of knowledge and
learning. Before that, we must briefly present social
learning that does not require teaching. Tomasello
(1999) distinguishes between learning by emulation,
where the learner observes the outcomes of the
model’s actions and tries to reach the same out-
come (goal-oriented copying), and learning by im-
itation, where the learner observes the sequence of
the model’s actions and tries to perform the same
actions (process-oriented copying) (see also Tehrani
& Riede 2008; Zentall 2001). In both examples, the
learning individual observes the behaviour of a sec-
ond knowledgeable individual (the model), while the
model does not adapt its behaviour to make it eas-
ier for the first individual to learn. Hence, no proper
teaching is taking place.
A central question is what skills and what knowl-
edge can be learned by imitation or emulation only,
and what require some form of proper teaching. In ar-
chaeological studies on social learning, the distinction
between copying and proper teaching is rarely done
(see, e.g., Morgan et al. 2015). For example, MacDonald
(2007, 398) concluded that ‘descriptions of how chil-
dren learn to use and manufacture hunting weapons
indicate that teaching is unimportant relative to obser-
vation and practice’. Referring to the discussion above
on different kinds of knowledge, it is obvious that
the way teaching in this example is opposed to ‘ob-
servation’ (copying) and ‘practice’ (’knowing how’)
is not adequate (see Lombard, this issue). Many hu-
man skills, let alone human knowledge systems, are so
complicated that they cannot be learned by imitation
or emulation only (Tehrani & Riede 2008, 318).
In this section we discuss teaching in three
grades:
(1) Helping and correcting: the teacher interferes with
what the learner does;
(2) Showing: the teacher draws attention and demon-
strates something to the learner;
(3) Explaining: the teacher clarifies by communicat-
ing concepts and making the learner perceive pat-
terns.
These three types build on each other in cognitive
development (see Ga¨rdenfors & Ho¨gberg submitted)
and they require different complexity in the inter-
action between ’knowing how’, ’knowing what’ and
’knowing that’.
Helping and correcting
A teacher may help learning by scaffolding the en-
vironment so that the learner learns quicker than
they would otherwise have done; the teacher’s inten-
tion simply being to provide that the learner exhibits
correct behaviour (Caro & Hauser 1992). The selec-
tion and transport of hammer-stones to nut-cracking
working areas by adult chimpanzees (Carvalho et al.
2008) is an example where learning is facilitated;
young chimps only have to choose a hammer-stone
from the selection brought to the site by the adults.
Another form is approval or disapproval of the
learner’s behaviour (Castro & Toro 2004). For example,
if the learner is about to eat a poisonous plant, the
teacher may show disapproval of this and thereby it
is to be hoped that the learner will learn to avoid that
kind of food.
As mentioned earlier, there are elements of teach-
ing involved also in play since adults and other peers
influence what is allowed in play (Lillehammer in
press). Such behaviour can be interpreted as a form
of teaching by approval and disapproval.
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Showing
A basic level of teaching is to draw attention to some-
thing that is relevant in the learning situation. The
teacher’s intention in so doing is that the learner fo-
cuses on a particular object, action or feature. If the
learner directs their attention to the intended goal,
shared attention is achieved. In order to reach joint atten-
tion, the learner must also see that the teacher attends
to the same thing, something that involves a form of
mind-reading on the part of the learner. Following
Mundy and Gomes’ (1998) terminology, the teacher
initiates joint attention and the learner responds to
joint attention. In stone knapping, joint attention is,
for example, involved when the teacher points to a
suitable platform area on a core and then detaches a
flake. When successful, the learner understands that
the teacher showed a suitable platform area and illus-
trated this by detaching a flake.
Demonstrating is a more complex way of show-
ing. It involves showing somebody else how to per-
form a task or how to solve a problem. Among hu-
mans, it is a ubiquitous form of teaching and children
begin to demonstrate at an early age (Strauss et al.
2002). When demonstrating, the teacher’s intention is
that the learner exhibits the right actions in the accu-
rate sequence. Highlighting initial and final states of
an action helps the learner in segmenting the sequence
of actions as well as in understanding the precondi-
tions for the initiation of the action and the properties
of its final result.
Demonstrating builds on advanced mind-
reading of both the teacher and the learner. It pre-
sumes that the teacher understands that the learner
does not know and that the learner perceives that
something is to be learned. This kind of teaching also
requires that the teacher and the learner jointly attend
to the demonstration. When the learner tries to im-
itate the demonstrated action, the teacher responds
with approval or disapproval and, if necessary, with
renewed demonstration.
Explaining
Human thinking is organized around concepts—this
is central to ‘knowing what’. When explaining, the
teacher communicates a concept with the intention
that the learner perceives a particular pattern that per-
tains to an object or an action (Ga¨rdenfors 2014). For
more abstract concepts, the intention is that the learner
mentally represents the relevant patterns.
It is not necessary for concepts to be communi-
cated by words. Before speech is available (in evolu-
tion or in development), an iconic gesture can also be
used. Explaining concepts relies on increased mind-
reading, since it presumes that the learner under-
stands that the teacher is intentionally using a gesture
or a sound as a communicative sign, that is, that the
gesture or sound is used to ‘stand for’ something else
(Zlatev et al. 2005).
An important type of teaching, based on commu-
nicating concepts, is when a learner is taught sub-goals
in a technological hierarchy, i.e. essential technological
actions that must be completed before the next stage
in production can start (Haidle 2010; Stout 2011). The
more complex a technology becomes, the more sub-
goals are involved (Mahaney 2014).
The main point in relation to teaching is that sub-
goals cannot be perceived directly from the action se-
quence. They are therefore difficult, or impossible, to
teach by showing. They must be explained by teaching
how to perceive the relevant patterns in the abstract
sub-goal structure. The sub-goals are not perceptually
available when the process starts, but they have to be
kept in mind by the learner as variables that need to
be coordinated within a structured sequence linking
sub-goals to each other.
In the following section, we provide archaeolog-
ical examples of how the kinds of teaching may be
used for understanding what was required for a spe-
cific technology. But first we present a schematic illus-
tration of how the different kinds of knowledge and
teaching are linked (Fig. 1).
Archaeological examples of teaching
In this section, we will present different kinds of
teaching and their cognitive requirements by briefly
discussing pre-Oldowan, Oldowan, early Acheulean
and late Acheulean technologies. These examples will
add concreteness to our earlier, more theoretical dis-
cussion. For more detailed analysis of the Oldowan
and late Acheulean technologies, see Ga¨rdenfors and
Ho¨gberg (submitted).
The oldest known knapped stones are from the
unique 3.3-million–year-old site of Lomekwi 3 in West
Turkana, Kenya (Harmand et al. 2015). Here Pliocene
hominins pre-dating early Homo combined core re-
duction with battering activities using local raw ma-
terials. The Lomekwi knappers had an emerging un-
derstanding of fracture properties in stone knapping.
Cores are rough, mostly made out of heavy and large-
sized cobbles or blocks. By using passive hammer
(block-on-block) and bipolar techniques, large irregu-
lar flakes were detached from one striking platform
onto a single surface. The knappers were able to
‘deliver sufficient intentional force to repeatedly de-
tach series of adjacent and superposed unidirectional
flakes’ (Harmand et al. 2015, 313). However, the cores
are irregular and technological attributes show that
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Figure 1. Schematic illustration of how the kinds of knowledge (black) and teaching (grey) discussed might link together.
The horizontal line of visual and motor representation from Heyes (2012) links to instruction (’knowing that’) and
practice (’knowing how’). Heyes’ vertical representation links visual and motor representation. The tool that is the result
of the actions performed materializes ’knowing what’ (Boivin 2008). Non-intentional teaching is emulation, trying to copy
the tool, and imitation, trying to copy the perceived process. A simple form of teaching is to help and correct in a single
vertical representation of visual and motor action (dotted line). A more advanced form of teaching is showing. Here the
vertical representation of action sequences is in focus, teaching that one action leads to another if performed in a sequence.
Explaining is a yet more complex form of teaching, focussing on how to perceive patterns. The vertical representation is of
action sequences, here taught as part of a pattern of inter-related sub-goals.
the knapping actions were poorly controlled (Har-
mand et al. 2015). To learn to produce this kind of
lithic assemblage, helping and correcting is enough.
The Oldowan is the earliest known stone-tool
technology associated with Homo. It is normally char-
acterized as based on flake production from simple
cores. Both flakes and cores were used as tools (Torre
2011). The techniques used in the Oldowan were
knapping with a hammer stone using direct percus-
sion or bipolar percussion with an anvil (Braun et al.
2008). Refitting analyses demonstrate that core main-
tenance was practised (Delagnes & Roche 2005). Core
maintenance is achieved by detaching flakes in a way
that makes it possible to strike further flakes from the
same core, that is, keeping the core active in a toolkit
without immediately exhausting it (Braun et al. 2008).
Oldowan technology can be learned through im-
itation, including rehearsal, and showing. By draw-
ing attention and demonstrating, the teacher intends
to make the learner understand action sequences in-
volved in the technology. Here, demonstration is re-
quired when the teacher shows the learner how to
detach a series of flakes, at the same time maintaining
the core to facilitate future flaking.
In terms of morphology, the Acheulean hand-
axes show extraordinary stability over time (Hodg-
son 2015). At the same time, in a long-term per-
spective, one finds a distinct refinement in symmetry
(Isaac 1982). Early hand-axes are generally thicker and
less symmetrical than the more elaborately shaped
later Acheulean hand-axes (Stout et al. 2014). Even
though comparisons over large geographical areas in-
dicate noteworthy differences, a dominant chronolog-
ical pattern towards more symmetric and standard-
ized tools from the early to late Acheulean is evidence
for an increasing preference over time for particular
proportions (Gowlett 2011).
Acheulean hand-axe technology requires ad-
vanced levels of intra-generational transmission of
knowledge (Shipton 2013). The production process
builds on a reduction strategy that maintains the
three-dimensional bifacial shape throughout the pro-
duction process. The actions performed are made up
of entangled sequences of techniques and methods
that, in part, repose on knowledge of specific con-
cepts, that is, ‘knowing what’. The production se-
quences cannot be learned by imitation (Mahaney
2014), they must be taught. This involves the teacher
breaking down the sequences into sub-goals and ex-
plaining these in order to convey the specific concepts
the learner must know to master the technology. The
teacher must adopt a holistic view of the complete
production process, and be able to teach the process
in such a way.
A number of theoretical models have been sug-
gested to explain the difference between early and late
Acheulean hand-axe production technology. These
models, relating to differences in cognitive capaci-
ties, typically deal with complexity of techniques and
methods involved, or aspects of symmetry and the
ability to produce a bifacial tool by visualizing and
processing a three-dimensional image (see Hodgson
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Table 1. Teaching and knowledge linked to stone-tool production within archaeological technologies. The numbers 1–5 are here used as
illustrations of stages in hypothetical action sequences.
Teaching type Knowledge taught Cognitive understanding Industry
Helping and correcting – Single isolated actions Pre-Oldowan
Showing Rudimentary action sequences
Core maintenance
One action leads to another action Oldowan
Showing Sophisticated action sequences
Three-dimensional bifacial reduction
One action leads to another
To reach the goal these actions needs to
be performed in a sequence:
1➔2 2➔3 3➔4 4➔5
Early Acheulean
Explaining Sophisticated action sequences
Three-dimensional bifacial reduction
Relevant patterns
One action leads to another
Explaining that to reach the goal the
actions needs to be performed in a
sequence of sub-goals:
1➔2➔3➔4➔5
Late Acheulean
2015 for a recent review). Recognizing the importance
of these models, Ga¨rdenfors and Ho¨gberg (submit-
ted) expand on them by focusing on the cognitive
capacities necessary to perform platform preparation in
particularly crucial phases of the production process.
Platform preparation represents a significant dif-
ference in learning between early and late Acheulean
hand-axe production (Stout et al. 2014). The teacher
must explain to the learner how platform preparation
isolates and alters the platform in the area from where
a flake is to be removed. The learner must therefore
be able to envisage the pattern that constitutes an ap-
propriate platform. When this is understood by the
learner, the teacher must show how to prepare the
platform to get it right, and how to apply force to
the piece so that the intended type of flake can be
detached. This involves explaining the concept of a
platform as well as the temporal patterns involved
in the action hierarchies necessary to prepare it. And
different phases in the tool production require differ-
ent approaches to how a platform is set up. Conse-
quently, the production process is a multivariate con-
struct (Gowlett 2011).
In Table 1 we summarize our discussion of dif-
ferent types of teaching. Since the different forms of
teaching presume different levels of mind-reading,
Donald’s (2012) concept of autocued rehearsal is
important for understanding how this might have
evolved. In a large-scale experimental study, Morgan
et al. (2015) tested how different social learning mech-
anisms could be used to transmit Oldowan stone-
knapping techniques. They conclude that cultural re-
liance on Oldowan tools generated a selection mech-
anism that favoured teaching (Morgan et al. 2015, 3).
Our discussion of ‘showing’ by drawing attention and
demonstrating to learn to understand rudimentary ac-
tion sequences and their interaction with autocued
memory increases our understanding of how social
learning might have worked for the Oldowan knap-
pers and how it differs from pre-Oldowan technolo-
gies. As mentioned earlier, Stout et al. (2014, 577) have
noted the importance of effective platform techniques
in the transition from early to late Acheulean. Here,
recall and rehearsal, in combination with cognitive
abilities to understand concepts and how these relate
to actions performed in patterned sequences with sub-
goals in action hierarchies, illustrate the suggested
development from early to late Acheulean hand-axe
production.
Conclusion
The ability to translate intelligence, imagination and
social interaction into technology must be regarded as
having had an essential impact on human evolution.
The way technology has been transmitted between
generations is thus essential for our understanding of
human development. Renfrew et al. (2009, xiii) see the
question of how Homo minds ‘learned to learn’ as es-
sential for our understanding of human cognitive evo-
lution. Here we have moved from learning to an inves-
tigation of how increasing levels of teaching have con-
tributed to the unique human social-cognitive niche
construction (Whiten & Erdal 2012).
As a grounding for our analysis, we discussed
different forms of knowledge— ’knowing how’,
’knowing what’ and ’knowing that’—and showed
their connections to different forms of learning and
long-term memory. This led us to identify three basic
types of teaching: helping and correcting, showing,
and explaining.
As an application of the theoretical framework,
we have presented an analysis of which types of
teaching are necessary for some Palaeolithic stone-
knapping technologies. The conclusion is that there
is a strong correlation between the complexity of
the technology and the complexity of the required
teaching.
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The articles in this section
This special section brings together articles by an inter-
national, interdisciplinary group of scholars and ex-
perts interested in the implications of social learning
and education for understanding human evolution.
The focus is on teaching in an evolutionary setting
and what evidence archaeology can bring forward
that is relevant to when and in what forms teaching
occurred in the Homo lineages. Interdisciplinary as-
pects of learning, teaching, language, cognition, neu-
roscience, stone-tool production, visual cultures and
hunting technologies are brought together and dis-
cussed from a wide range of perspectives.
The articles originate from the workshop ‘How
did Homo sapiens become Homo docens? On the evo-
lution of social learning and teaching’, held in Novem-
ber 2013 at Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study
(STIAS), Wallenberg Research Centre, at Stellenbosch
University, South Africa. The two main questions in
focus at the workshop were the following:
(1) What are the implications of how teaching
emerged for our understanding of human evo-
lution?
(2) How can we understand teaching during the Early
Stone Age?
A uniting theme throughout the section is to analyse
aspects of how to develop an interdisciplinary un-
derstanding of education throughout prehistory and
what is meant by understanding and knowing in dif-
ferent contexts and eras. The goal is to analyse what
forms teaching may have taken throughout the deep
time of the Homo lineage and to suggest theoretical
perspectives and methods to talk about teaching and
learning in an archaeological framework.
Along the lines as we have discussed above,
D’Errico and Banks argue that the emergence of
teaching cannot be understood if it is only associ-
ated with the origin of our species. A perspective that
goes beyond Homo sapiens is needed. They distinguish
between spatial, temporal and social dimensions of
teaching. The spatial dimension concerns how easy it
is for the learner to copy the teacher, depending on the
distance between them. Here d’Errico and Banks in-
clude gesture moulding (when teacher and learner are
in bodily contact) and explanation-complemented ac-
tion where verbal (or gestural) explanations are added
to the bodily actions. The temporal dimension con-
cerns, for example, whether teaching consists in a
single information transfer event or in repetitive or
sequential information events. Finally, the social di-
mension deals with, for example, whether the teach-
ing is horizontal transmission, describing transfers
that take place between individuals of the same gener-
ation, or vertical transmission, in which information
is passed from parent to offspring. Their approach
combines concepts and analytical tools from a variety
of disciplines into an operational framework that can
be used to identify and study potential means and
mechanisms of transmitting cultural information. In
so doing they provide a basis for an evolutionary per-
spective on teaching that relies on material culture
recovered from archaeological contexts.
Increasing reliance on skill-intensive subsistence
strategies appears to be a hallmark of human evolu-
tion, with wide-ranging implications for brain size,
life-history and cognitive adaptations. In the arti-
cle by Dietrich Stout and Nada Khreisheh, meth-
ods from neuroscience are discussed. The authors de-
scribe how Palaeolithic tool replication experiments
offer a new avenue for establishing empirical links be-
tween technological behaviours, neurocognitive sub-
strates and material culture recovered from archae-
ological contexts. In modern humans, skill teaching
and learning are facilitated by cognitive capacities for
complex imitation, joint attention and pedagogy, as
well as affective dispositions favouring pro-sociality
and enhanced self-regulation. These cognitive and
life-history parameters describe a human technolog-
ical niche that relies on efficient intergenerational re-
production of increasingly complex foraging tech-
niques, in particular the production and effective use
of tools. Stout and Khreisheh conclude that the ar-
chaeological record provides a valuable source of
evidence for tracing the emergence of this modern
human condition, but research will require commit-
ments of time and effort to address the complex skills
properly.
The following two articles discuss different as-
pects of material culture in relation to teaching and
learning. Stone Age hunting technologies are consid-
ered byMarlize Lombard, and the Upper Palaeolithic
visual cultures manifested by cave art from southwest
Europe are discussed by April Nowell. Hunting tech-
niques and cave art are central topics in studies of
human evolution. Here this central evidence of pre-
historic material culture is discussed from the per-
spective of teaching and learning.
Human hunting represents one of the most dif-
ficult foraging activities. It is a skill-intensive pur-
suit with an extended learning process. Stone Age
hunter-gatherers used complex strategies and tech-
nologies to outsmart and pursue their prey. Lombard
discusses aspects of how such strategies and tech-
nologies were grounded in extensive knowledge that
facilitated context-specific solutions during different
phases of weapon production and hunting. She con-
cludes that, apart from subsistence behaviour, Stone
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Age hunting technologies also inform about a suite
of associated skills, behaviours and levels of cogni-
tion. In her article, Lombard provides an overview and
broad timeline of the ‘evolution’ of hunting technolo-
gies associated with the southern African Stone Age
record and presents ethnographic hunter-gatherer ex-
amples of teaching and learning associated with hunt-
ing. In so doing, she situates the archaeological and
ethnographic data within a theoretical framework of
teaching and learning evolution.
During the Upper Palaeolithic, southwest France
and northern Spain were sites of locally situated Pleis-
tocene visual cultures that were both quantitatively
and qualitatively different from the symbol-using cul-
tures that came before them. Nowell discusses chil-
dren’s phenomenological experience in these visual
cultures and their embodied participation in commu-
nities of practice as a process of both ‘seeing to learn’
and ‘learning to see’. She starts from the premise that
children are not born picture-users, but in the pro-
cess of developing a pictorial competence, she ar-
gues that children must have been able to hold in
their minds both a picture and its referent simulta-
neously, as well as understanding the nature of the
relationship between a representation and its refer-
ent. The very special visual cultures have in this
sense influenced the children’s evolution, making
them both symbolists and materialists. Upper Palae-
olithic children learned to move fluidly between three-
dimensional and two-dimensional worlds and to per-
ceive a fourth dimension of time through motion from
still images. These abilities not only permitted, but
also forged, new ways of imagining and acting in the
world.
The evolution of language is a disputed topic.
As regards the evolution of teaching, it is important
to understand the role of linguistic communication in
the relation between teacher and learner. The last ar-
ticle in this special section focuses on the evolution
of language. On the basis of recent studies, Rudolf
Botha discusses conceptual bridges that span the on-
tological gap between the behaviours and capacities
of modern humans and those of the earlier hominins.
Focusing on studies that draw inferences about the so-
cial use of language by hominins from data about the
linguistic behaviour of modern hunter-gatherers and
other modern people with traditional cultures, Botha
elaborates on source-critical factors involved in these
studies. In particular, he discusses uniformitarian as-
sumptions, maintaining that knowledge of processes
operative in the past can be inferred by observing
processes in the present. He argues that the linguistic,
behavioural and cultural differences between earlier
hominins and modern humans discourage an appeal
to uniformitarian assumptions to warrant the infer-
ential step from ethnographic data about the linguis-
tic behaviour of modern hunter-gatherers to conclu-
sions about the linguistic behaviour of non-modern
hominins.
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